We consider a median voter model with uncertainty about how the economy functions. The distribution of income is exogenously given and the provision of a public good is financed through a proportional tax. Voters and politicians do not know the true production function for the public good, but...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...

We study the use of asset-backed money in a neoclassical growth model with illiquid capital. A mechanism is delegated control of productive capi- tal and issues claims against the revenue it earns. These claims constitute a form of asset-backed money. The mechanism determines (i) the number of...

How can a central bank control interest rates in an environment with large excess reserves? In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of a secured money market and calibrate it to the Swiss franc repo market to study this question. The theoretical model allows us to identify...

The goal of this paper is to study how informational frictions affect asset liquidity in OTC markets in a laboratory setting. The experiments replicate an OTC market similar to the one used in monetary and financial economics (Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2005):...