This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism that the literature focuses...

This paper considers platform competition in a two-sided market that includes buyers and sellers. One of the platforms benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that for this platform it is less costly than for the other platform to convince customers that the two sides will...

In this article, we review the recent developments in the digital currency landscape. We survey the economic drivers that led to the creation of digital currencies and show that they are a natural step in the evolution of means of payment. We overview two major classes of digital currencies,...

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes “focal” in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium...

We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex-ante uncertainty and ex- post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new tech- nology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a...

We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex-ante uncertainty and ex-post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new technology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a lower...

It is generally agreed that permissioned blockchains can improve on the operational cost and performance of permissionless blockchains, but it is usually assumed that this improvement comes at the cost of transaction security, especially in low-trust environments. We develop a model of...

In this commentary, we argue that studies similar to Cennamo, Marchesi, and Meyer (2020) should distinguish four dimensions of control in blockchain governance, all of which could be more or less decentralized. For some of these dimensions, decentralization is likely beneficial, while for others...

We consider a methodology for studying how beliefs shape platform competition, based on the notion of a partial focality. The concept of focality is useful for modeling platform competition when the presence of network effects results in multiple equilibria for a certain set of prices. We...

Platform-specific digital tokens are becoming increasingly common with the proliferation of initial coin offerings (ICOs). In addition to a novel financing mechanism, such tokens can help address the coordination problem that is common in network adoption. We develop a model to investigate the...