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Large public bureaucracies are usually less efficient than modern private corporations. This paper explains how the degree of discretionary power might account for this difference in efficiency. In fact, increasing the discretionary power of the intermediate layers of an organization can enhance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005510507
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005270598
It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization or a vertical structure creates efficiency losses, and hence should be prevented. This paper shows that whenever collusion takes the form of co-insurance agreements, here called `friendships', among the members of a vertical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118550
We develop a simple theoretical model of a long term buyer-supplier relationship with non-contractible buyer specific R&D investment, and derive predictions on the effects of trust and competition on suppliers’ investment and buyers’ procurement strategies. We address these issues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194234
It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization or a vertical structure creates efficiency losses, and hence should be prevented. This paper shows that whenever collusion takes the form of co-insurance agreements, here called ?friendships?, among the members of a vertical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670735
This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670737
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789151
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails its sale. This Paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by retaining the minority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791603
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails a change of control. By efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure it is usually meant that the control is allocated into the hands of those who can maximize its value. In this paper we focus instead on how to allocate control with a procedure that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791713
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005657201