Voluntary disclosure literature suggests that in evidence games, where the informed sender chooses which pieces of evidence to disclose to the uninformed receiver who determines his payoff, commitment has no value, as there is a theoretical equivalence of the optimal mechanism and the game...

I develop a model of contracting under reciprocal altruism accounting for some evidence which is paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical models with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game...

Recent literature has shown that lying behavior in the laboratory can well be explained by a combination of lying costs and reputation concerns. We extend the literature on lying behavior to strategic interactions. As reciprocal behavior is important in many interactions, we study a theoretical...

In this paper, I test the predictions of rational inattention theory using a laboratory experiment where one role in a two-player game faces cognitive costs to process information about a payoff-relevant state. I find that subjects who face these unobservable cognitive costs have state-dependent...

This paper studies communication games in which the sender is possibly honest (who tells the truth) and the receiver is possibly naive (who follows the messages as if they were truthful) and the message space is finite. I establish the existence of a message-monotone equilibrium (in which the...

This paper studies an economic contest with two participants, who are overconfident in their own relative abilities. We examine two different sources of overconfidence, overestimation of one's own ability and underestimation of the rival's ability, and compare the behavioral consequences of each...

The centipede game posits one of the most well‐known paradoxes of backward induction in the literature of experimental game theory. Given that deviations from the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium generates a Pareto improvement, several theoretical models have been employed in order to...

Actual behaviour is influenced in important ways by moral emotions, for instance guilt or shame (see among others Tangney et al., 2007). Belief-dependant models of social preferences using the framework of psychological games aim to consider such emotions to explain other-regarding behaviour....

Actual behaviour is influenced in important ways by moral emotions, for instance guilt or shame (see, among others, Tangney et al., 2007). Belief-dependant models of social preferences using the framework of psychological games aim to consider such emotions to explain other-regarding behaviour....