We provide the first investigation of the relationship between self-awareness and dis- honesty in a multi-wave pre-registered experiment with 1,260 subjects. In the first wave we vary the level of awareness of subjects' past dishonesty and explore the impact on behaviour in tasks that include...

Does being lucky (or unlucky) affect honest decision-making? We examine (1) whether luck-based income strengthens or erodes the moral value of honesty; (2) whether the perceived level of agency over an uncertain event affects the relationship between luck and honesty; and (3) whether accumulated...

We find that probabilistic deceit detection and cheap-talk threats enhance the fairness and honesty of a bargainer who possesses advantageous information and has the opportunity to be deceitful. In our ultimatum game, only proposers know the size of the pie. Proposers, therefore, have the option...

This paper uses data from a controlled laboratory environment to study the impact of transparency (i.e., complete information versus incomplete information) and repeated interactions on the level of trust and trustworthiness in an investment game setting. The key findings of the study are that...

This study experimentally investigates the role of two-sided cheap talk in decisions under asymmetric information. Unlike previous studies, our study also considers endogenous investment timing. In our experiments, subjects play two-player global games with asymmetric information. Before making...

Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. Usually these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In this Dictator game study, we investigate whether social framing effects...

In this paper, I suggest a new experimental method for measuring (dis)honest information transmission. Subjects play a variant of the dictator game in which the dictator’s decision whether to lie (either to or against his advantage) or whether to be honest, when communicating private...

There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract information from hypothetical events - like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction perform better when the requirements for this cognitive...

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...