Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationalityof the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative.When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost,the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...

I conduct an experiment to assess whether majority voting on a nonbindingsharing norm affects subsequent behavior in a dictator game. Ina baseline treatment, subjects play a one shot dictator game. In a votingtreatment, subjects are first placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ and vote onthe...

Can one define and test the hypothesis of (un)bounded rationality instochastic choice tasks without endorsing Bayesianism? Similar to the state specificity of assets, we rely on state-specific goal formation. In a given choice task, the list of state-specific goal levels is optimal if one cannot...

This experimental study, first, compares the individual valuations of two risk reduction mechanisms: self-insurance and self-protection. Second, it investigates these valuations when the loss amount is ambiguous, and compare these values with valuations when loss amounts are known. results...

This Monte-Carlo study investigates sensitivity of the Wilcoxon signed rank test to certainassumption violations in small samples. Emphasis is put on within-sample-dependence,between-sample dependence, and the presence of ties. Our results show that both assumptionviolations induce severe size...

Parimutuel betting markets are simplified financial markets, andcan thus provide a clearer view of pricing issues which are more complicatedelsewhere. Though empirical studies generally conclude thatthe parimutuel betting markets are surprisingly efficient, it is alsofound that for horses with...

Does geographic distance or the perceived social distance between subjects significantlyaffect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question,subjects play a one-shot ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and apassive dummy player) and...

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) whichspecifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametricfamilies of CSF’s. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends onthe investments and a vector of...

We consider guilt averse agents and principals and study the effects ofguilt on optimal behavior of the principal and the agent in a moral hazardmodel.The principal’s contract proposal contains a target effort in addition tothe monetary incentive scheme. By accepting the agreement, the...

´This paper aims to analize the role of personal identity indecision making. To this end, it starts by reviewing criticallythe growing literature on economics and identity. Consideringthe ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposalfocuses on the concept of personal...