Modern environmental problems are a consequence of human action. They not only pose thepredicament of who is to be held responsible; but exhibit such a complexity, that our ability totake responsibility for interventions into nature at all, is drawn into doubt. And what preciselydoes it mean, to...

Dieser Aufsatz dient dem Versuch, ein konsistentes wirtschaftspolitisches Bewertungsverfahrenzur Analyse der Leistungsfähigkeit der genossenschaftlichen Bankunternehmung zuentwickeln. Dafür wird das auf linearer Programmierung beruhende Schätzverfahren "DataEnvelopment Analysis (DEA)"...

In this paper, we discuss the relationship between responsibility and joint production.Responsibility mirrors our ability to act freely. We can act freely only if we can assumeresponsibility for our actions and their consequences; the limits of our responsibility aretherefore also the limits of...

In diesem Aufsatz untersuchen wir die Beziehung von Verantwortung und Kuppelproduktion.Unsere Verantwortung reflektiert unsere Fähigkeit, frei zu handeln. Wir können nur freihandeln, insofern wir für unsere Handlungen und ihre Folgen Verantwortung übernehmen; dieGrenzen unserer Verantwortung...

The concept of a non-extreme-outcome-additive capacity (neo-additive capacity ) is introduced.Neo-additive capacitiesmodel optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncertaintyas observed in many experimental studies. Moreover, neo-additive capacities canbe applied easily in economic...

In a punishment experiment, we separate the demand for punishment in general from a possible demand to conduct punishment personally. Subjects experience an unfair split of their earnings from a real effort task and have to decide on the punishment of the person who determines the distribution....

In this paper we investigate trade union formation. To this end we apply a model with two types of labour where both groups decide on whether they prefer to be represented by either two independent craft-specific (professional) labour unions or by a joint (encompassing) labour union. Applying...

In a punishment experiment, we separate the demand for punishment in general from the demand to conduct punishment personally. Subjects experience an unfair split of their earnings from a real effort task and have to decide on the punishment of the person who determines the distribution. First,...

Teams, in both firms and in sports, jointly produce a product. While a fixed task is assigned to each member of a team, the individual team productivity of a worker or player is difficult to conceptualize. This is particularly true, if this concept is aimed to be operable on observable data. In...

This paper contributes to the analysis of central vs. decentral (firm-level) labour market negotiations. We argue that during negotiations on a central scale employers and employees plausibly take output market effects into account, while they behave competitively during firm-level negotiations....