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Designing fair tiebreak mechanisms : the case of FIFA penalty shootouts

Anbarcı, Nejat; Sun, Ching-Jen; Ünver, M. Utku - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011293850

Designing practical and fair sequential team contests : the case of penalty shootouts

Anbarcı, Nejat; Sun, Ching-Jen; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Games and economic behavior 130 (2021), pp. 25-43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819963

Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions : a simple Nash program

Anbarcı, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen - In: Economics letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 211-214

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010127759

Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution

Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen - In: Social Choice and Welfare 37 (2011) 3, pp. 453-470

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324497

Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution

Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen - In: Social Choice and Welfare 37 (2011) 3, pp. 425-429

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324505

Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program

Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen - In: Economics letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 211-214

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010137764

Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution

Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen - In: Social choice and welfare 37 (2011) 3, pp. 425-430

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009258675

Designing Fair Tiebreak Mechanisms : The Case of FIFA Penalty Shootouts

Anbarci, Nejat - 2015

In the current FIFA penalty shootout mechanism, a coin toss decides which team will kick first. Empirical evidence suggests that the team taking the first kick has a higher probability to win a shootout. We design sequentially fair shootout mechanisms such that in all symmetric Markov-perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029005

Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions

Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen - In: Games and economic behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 367-376

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010054006

Distributive Justice and Bargaining Solutions

Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen - Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School … - 2009

Suppes-Sen Dominance is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash (1950).s Scale Invariance (SI) axiom and an axiom named Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSP) that embodies the Suppes-Sen principle. By...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008474120