Lockups are agreements made by insiders of stock-issuing firms to abstain from selling shares for a specified period of time after the issue. Brav and Gompers (2003) suggest that lockups are a bonding solution to a moral hazard problem and not a signaling solution to an adverse selection...

Dynamic competitive models of industry evolution suggest that firm profit will be more volatile and turnover will be lower in industries with higher sunk costs. These implications are consistent with empirical observation.

Dynamic competitive models of industry evolution predict higher variability of firm value over time and lower variability of firm activity over time in industries where sunk entry costs are higher. These predictions have done well empirically. Here we extend the theory to allow an additional...

We explore the questions of whether and why out-of-state buyers pay more for real estate than their in-state counterparts. Theoretically, we develop a model capable of explaining a premium if out-of-state buyers have high search costs, upwardly biased beliefs about prices or an unusually short...

We explore the questions of whether and why Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) pay more for real estate than non-REIT buyers, consequently breaking the law of one price. We develop a model where REITs optimally pay more for property because (1) they are able, due to capital access advantages...

Two of the most robust results from dynamic competitive models of industrial organization suggest that higher-sunk-cost industries should exhibit higher intertemporal variability in the market value of their firms and lower intertemporal variability in the size of their industries. These...