This paper contributes to the analysis of central vs. decentral (firm-level) labour market negotiations. We argue that during negotiations on a central scale employers and employees plausibly take output market effects into account, while they behave competitively during firm-level negotiations....

A number of authors have recently emphasized that the conventional model of unemployment dynamics due to Mortensen and Pissarides has difficulty accounting for the relatively volatile behavior of labor market activity over the business cycle. We address this issue by modifying the MP framework...

A number of authors have recently emphasized that the conventional model of unemployment dynamics due to Mortensen and Pissarides has difficulty accounting for the relatively volatile behavior of labor market activity over the business cycle. We address this issue by modifying the MP framework...

Using two types of overlapping generations (OLG) model, we show that involuntary unemployment is in a Nash equilibrium of a game with a firm and consumers, and we can achieve full-employment by fiscal policy financed by seignorage not tax. Once we achieve it, it is maintained without government...

We show the existence of involuntary unemployment based on consumers' utility maximization and firms' profit maximization behavior under monopolistic competition with increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale technology using a three-periods overlapping generations (OLG) model with a...

This paper contributes to the analysis of central vs. decentral (firm-level) labour market negotiations. We argue that during negotiations on a central scale employers and employees plausibly take output market effects into account, while they behave competitively during firm-level negotiations....