The paper investigates the factors that influence the decision to change the status of a publicly quoted company to that of a private company. We find that firms that go private are more likely to have higher CEO ownership and higher institutional ownership. In relation to their board...

This paper investigates how far UK public to private transactions can be explained by financial distress costs or incentive realignment. We find that firms going private are more likely to be smaller, more diversified, younger and have lower Q ratios than firms remaining public. The results...

This paper investigates the extent to which firms going private have different characteristics from other acquired firms. We find the firms going private have higher board shareholdings and higher institutional shareholdings. In addition, they have poorer growth prospects and experience more...

This paper investigates the extent to which firms going private have different characteristics from other acquired firms. We find the firms going private have higher CEO shareholdings and higher institutional shareholdings. In addition, they have poorer growth prospects. However, there is no...

The agency model provides a number of ways to address the problems raised by the separation of ownership and control in public limited liability companies. In its Code of Best Practice, the Cadbury Committee proposed a variety of monitoring mechanisms which, if implemented, should improve...

We analyse the agency influences on an increasingly common phenomenon, the change of status from public to private. We find that companies going private are more likely to have higher CEO and institutional shareholdings. We also find firms going private are more likely to have the same person as...

This paper analyses the board composition and ownership structures of a sample of companies that have been acquired by friendly take-over and those of a matching control sample that have not. We find significant governance differences between the friendly take-over targets and the control...

The paper analyses the corporate governance mechanisms of a sample of companies that have been acquired by friendly take-over and those of a matching control sample that have not. It also uses a holdout sample to assess the model's ability to correctly classify take-over candidates. The results...