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Learning about a class of belief-dependent preferences without information on beliefs
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2011
which includes reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) and guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) as … effect of reciprocity in the games we consider. Our bounds suggest the model of reciprocity we consider is not a significant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280712
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Learning about a Class of Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information on Beliefs
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2011
which includes reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) and guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) as … effect of reciprocity in the games we consider. Our bounds suggest the model of reciprocity we consider is not a significant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278173
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Measuring Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information about Beliefs
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2019
We derive bounds on the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences (reciprocity and guilt aversion) on choices in … reciprocity in the games we consider. These bounds suggest there exists significant reciprocity in our population – a result also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012005854
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Measuring Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information about Beliefs
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2019
We derive bounds on the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences (reciprocity and guilt aversion) on choices in … reciprocity in the games we consider. These bounds suggest there exists significant reciprocity in our population – a result also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018196
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Measuring belief-dependent preferences without information about beliefs
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2019
We derive bounds on the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences (reciprocity and guilt aversion) on choices in … reciprocity in the games we consider. These bounds suggest there exists significant reciprocity in our population - a result also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011972338
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Measuring belief-dependent preferences without information about beliefs
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2019
We derive bounds on the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences (reciprocity and guilt aversion) on choices in … reciprocity in the games we consider. These bounds suggest there exists significant reciprocity in our population - a result also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011979210
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Measuring the willingness to pay to avoid guilt: estimation using equilibrium and stated belief models
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Strobel, Martin - 2010
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid feeling guilt by letting down another player. We compare estimates of WTP under the assumption that higher-order beliefs are in equilibrium (i.e. consistent with the choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269416
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Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation using Equilibrium and Stated Belief Models
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Strobel, Martin - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2010
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid feeling guilt by letting down another player. We compare estimates of WTP under the assumption that higher-order beliefs are in equilibrium (i.e. consistent with the choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565834
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Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation using Equilibrium ad Stated Belief Models
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Strobel, Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2010
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid feeling guilt by letting down another player. We compare estimates of WTP under the assumption that higher-order beliefs are in equilibrium (i.e. consistent with the choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583297
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Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation Using Equilibrium and Stated Belief Models
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Strobel, Martin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid feeling guilt by letting down another player. We compare estimates of WTP under the assumption that higher-order beliefs are in equilibrium (i.e. consistent with the choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562544