The article proposes a research program to compare game forms in terms of their ability to govern ex post adjustments to ex ante contracts. The comparisons can be based on direct implementation-costs or the extent to which desirable adjustments are not implemented. In several examples of the...

The paper is concerned with communication within a team of players trying to coordinate in response to information dispersed among them. The problem is nontrivial because they cannot communicate all information instantaneously, but have to send longer or shorter sequences of messages, using...

We use a dataset describing ownership of productive assets in the carpentry trade to evaluate several factors influencing the allocation of asset ownership between an employer and his employees. The findings suggest that the allocation involves a tradeoff between two incentive effects...

This paper is concerned with economies in which agents find sellers and employers in a time-consuming search process while they simultaneously trade with their current partners. A symmetric steady-state equilibrium does not exist, but asymmetric steady-state equilibria exist and are such that...

It has recently been suggested that a number of experimental findings of context effects in choice settings can be explained by the ability of subjects to draw choice-relevant inferences from the stimuli. We aim to measure the importance of this explanation. To do so, inferences are assessed in...

We ask how bargainers' incentives to communicate about more efficient widget designs depend on whether they negotiate price prior to, or after, fixing the traded design. We find three effects: (1) Since communication reveals information about preferences, bargainers with little power prefer to...

"Attempts to economize on bargaining costs imply that two parties may write a contract which is incomplete in the sense that each party tacitly cedes some decision rights to the other. If decision makers can be disciplined by the threat of ex post renegotiation of decisions initially delegated...