We build a moral hazard model to study incentives of financial intermediaries (shortly, bankers) facing a leverage-insurance trade-off in their investment choice. We demonstrate that the choice is affected by two recent transformations of the financial ecosystem bankers inhabit: (i) the rise of...

The 2007-2008 financial crises has made it painfully obvious that markets may quickly turn illiquid.Moreover, recent experience has shown that distress and lack of active trading can jump “around”between seemingly unconnected parts of the financial system contributing to transforming...

The persistence of financial instability calls into question the adequacy of the current regulatory regime. Acritical review of the three pillars at the core of current financial regulation exposes some structural flaws.[...]

The theoretical literature remains inconclusive on whether changes in bank exposure towards the domestic sovereign have an adverse effect on the sovereign risk position via a diabolic loop in the sovereign-bank nexus or reduce perceived default risk by acting as a disciplinary device for the...