Showing 121 - 130 of 155
We consider an analytic formulation/parametrization of the class of efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU games that, in contrast to previous approaches, which rely on the standard basis, rests on the linear representation of TU games by unanimity games. Unlike most of the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010954232
We provide a new characterization of the Shapley value neither using the efficiency axiom nor the additivity axiom. In this characterization, efficiency is replaced by the gain-loss axiom (Einy and Haimanko, 2011), i.e., whenever the total worth generated does not change, a player can only gain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065143
We introduce a weighted version of the component efficient χ-value [Casajus, A., 2009. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability. Games and Economic Behavior 65 (1), 49–61] for TU games with a coalition structure. We provide characterizations both for a symmetric and for an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065162
The Shapley value probably is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard characterization, the null player property indicates the absence of solidarity among the players. First, we replace the null player property by a new axiom that guarantees null players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065473
We provide a new interpretation of the potential of the Shapley value as the expected worth of some random partition of the player set. Using this insight, we advocate the potential as an index of power concentration in simple monotonic games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076560
The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076675
Within a simple setup, we show that proportional taxation is implied by three properties: efficiency, symmetry, and monotonicity. Efficiency: redistribution has no cost. Symmetry: members of the society with the same performance obtain the same reward after redistribution. Monotonicity: whenever...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010936498
The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution to the CPCA. This index is characterized by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011846376
We introduce the concepts of the components' second-order productivities in cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) with a coalition structure (CS games) and of the components' second-order payoffs for one-point solutions for CS games as generalizations of the players'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015187484
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006088544