The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution to the CPCA. This index is characterized by...

We suggest two alternatives to the Lovász-Shapley value for non-negatively weighted TU games (Casajus and Wiese, 2017. Int. J. Game Theory 46, 295-310), the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley² value. Whereas the former is based on the Lovász extension operator for TU games (Lovász,...

This book introduces a new rationalistic approach towards the formalization of Schelling's concept of focal points within a general game-theoretic framework. The focus is on focal points as a symmetry-breaking device. Hence, focal points in coordination games can be explained while focal points...

First, we suggest and discuss second-order versions of solutions for TU games used to characterize the Banzhaf value, in particular, of standardness for two-player games, of the dummy player property, and of 2-efficiency. Then, we provide a number of characterizations of the Banzhaf value...