Laffont and Tirole (1988) show that when the uncertainty about the agent's ability is small, the equilibrium must involve a large amount of pooling, but whether the continuation equilibrium induced by a optimal first-period menu of contracts is partition or not remains unclear. They construct a...

This paper considers a dynamic model of price competition in which sellers are endowed with one unit of the good and compete by posting prices in every period. Buyers each demand one unit of the good and have a common reservation price. They have full information regarding the prices posted by...

A new, more fundamental approach is proposed to the classical bargaining problem. The give-and-take feature in the negotiation process is explicitly modelled under the new framework. A compromise set consists of all allocations a bargainer is willing to accept as agreement. We focus on the...

This paper develops a general two-period model of product line pricing with customer recognition. Specifically, we consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer demands one unit of the product in each period. In...