A class of non cooperative games characterized by a `congestion e ect' is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy pro les maximizing the potential function coincide.The structure of the...

This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the best- reply multifunctions can take in 2×2×2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2×2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents’ pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set.

The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

Finite potential games have Nash equilibria in pure strategies.This note provides some results on the existence of equilibria or approximate equilibria if some players have infinite sets of strategies.

This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.

A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we address the problem of allocating the profits between the charter members and the entrants, once the nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement.Using game theory we argue...