Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A <Subscript>1</Subscript>,A <Subscript>2</Subscript>,…,A <Subscript> n </Subscript>, and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a <Subscript>1</Subscript>,a <Subscript>2</Subscript>,…,a <Subscript> n </Subscript>)...</subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript>

This paper defines "negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium'', a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of self-interested players may choose, voluntarily and without...

Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game for which agents’ behavior is fundamentally different even though the Nash prediction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such findings. Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration...

We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley-Shubik trading-post game.

The aim of this investigation is to show how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For our purposes, the basic game is a repeated version of the Beauty Contest Game (BCG), a simple guessing game in which repetition lets...

This paper shows the relevance of Popper's Rationality Principle (RP) for the appraisal of the impressive mass work emerging, in recent years, in the fields of rationality, learning, evolutionary games and behavioral economic theory. In contradistinction to the well-known rigid criteria of the...