This paper is about what is called usually SME (Small and medium-sized entreprises, thus including the very small companies). But it raises in preamble the question of the relevance, from an economic point of view, of this statistical category, defined, for example, like the companies employing...

This paper analyzes workers' choices to sort in large and small firms. Workers care to realize their ideas as they share the associated benefits with the firm. Small firms being less capitalized are more inclined to realize their workers' risky ideas, but better capitalized firms provide safe...

Corporate governance deals with the legal and organizational structures that determine the way in which a company is managed. It is about the exercise of power over corporate entities.Throughout the twentieth century, there have been few rules to guide us and a scarcity of fine example to...

This paper attempts to explain organization structure based on optimal coordination of interactions among activities. The main idea is that each manager is capable of detecting and coordinating interactions only within his limited area of expertise. Only the CEO can coordinate company-wide...

This paper identifies why US, UK and Australian corporations do not allow directors to avoid conflicts of self-interest, and why corporations lack self-regulation. To avoid conflicts of self-interest, a separation of powers is required to create a compound board. Directors cannot fulfill their...

This paper formulates and empirically tests a model that describes the balance sheet adjustments of debt and equity financed U.S. nonfinancial enterprises over the twentieth century. In this model asset adjustments change the expected income and operating risk of firms while financing...

Mass privatization offers a particularly suitable framework to study the change in ownership concentration as the extent of change is unusual for a stable market economy. Focusing on two different mass privatization schemes in two transition economies, Poland and the Czech Republic, we find that...

Using a dynamic model with uncertainty and asymmetric information, we study the impact of debt and bankruptcy on managerial compensation and learning. In this model, compensation has two roles to play - providing incentives to the manager and learning about his type. We show that debt, through...

In this we paper we explain why maximizing shareholder value should be the sole objective function for governing the corporation and why that objective function is, on balance, good for all stakeholders. Shareholder value maximization is the ideal corporate goal because it is the best among all...

Stock option grants to top managers have largely contributed to the dramatic increase in US executive pay in recent years. In this paper it is argued that stock options, compared to other forms of compensation, have created strong incentives for managers to engage in lobbying activities for...