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We set up a model of elections or referendums with two alternatives to study how voter turnout and election outcomes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320990
copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286937
contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003459198
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746679
This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the voters' capacity to identify and empower well-suited politicians. In our model, candidates are heterogeneous in two unobservable quality aspects: ability and public-spiritedness....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430775
We show that a large electorate of ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive very noisy signals about her performance. We find that the accountability problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011287647
elections (exogenous elections) andthe decision is salient and the election outcome depends on it (endogenous elections).We show …. Furthermore, in contrast to the existing literature, wedemonstrate that, when elections are exogenous, polarization between … political parties does not always decreaseactive learning. In the case with endogenous elections we find that electoral concerns …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316875
This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the voters' capacity to identify and empower competent politicians. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their abilities and are driven by office rents as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483274
We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022729
Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core … examine reasons that, in large-N elections, the number of votes that an individual casts may deviate substantially from that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011578439