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Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolò, Antonio - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 2, pp. 373-402

We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215297

Looking beyond the incumbent: The effects of exposing corruption on electoral outcomes

Chong, Alberto; De La O, Ana L.; Karlan, Dean; … - 2012

copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286937

Tax Contracts and Elections

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts, a novel instrument, on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083822

Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Chong, Alberto; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084114

Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies

Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

In elections that take place in a less-than-perfect democracy, incumbency advantages are different from those in mature … model of elections and mass protests, where the purpose of competitive elections is to reveal information about the relative … elections, mediocre ones prevent credible opponents from running or cancel elections, and the least competent ones use outright …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084133

Centralization and Accountability: Theory and Evidence from the Clean Air Act

Boffa, Federico; Piolatto, Amedeo; Ponzetto, Giacomo AM - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters’ ability to monitor public officials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians provide public goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voter information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084457

Centralization and Accountability : Theory and Evidence from the Clean Air Act

Boffa, F.; Piolatto, A.; Ponzetto, G.A.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012

Abstract: This paper studies fiscal federalism when voter information varies across regions. We develop a model of political agency with heterogeneously informed voters. Rentseeking politicians provide public goods to win the votes of the informed. As a result, rent extraction is lower in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090947

Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare

Prat, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997

This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players: a continuum of voters, two candidates, and one interest group. The group has non-verifiable insider...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091643

Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies

Prat, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998

I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092621

Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies

Gersbach, Hans; Tejada, Oriol; Schneider, Maik T. - CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of … - 2014

We examine the effects of a novel political institution, which we call Coalition- Preclusion Contracts, on elections …, policies, and welfare. Coalition-Preclusion Contracts enable political parties to credibly commit before the elections not to … form a coalition after the elections with one or several other parties specified in the contract. We consider a political …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010762513