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Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency. The incentive contract does not require …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789074

Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates

Berliant, Marcus; Konishi, Hideo - EconWPA - 2004

Which issues are discussed by candidates in an election campaign? Why are some issues never discussed? Model tractability is lost quickly when dealing with these questions, partly because of the multidimensional voting inherent in models of multiple issues. Our model features two candidates for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118536

How Polarization and Political Instability affect Learning through Experimentation

Ossokina, Ioulia V.; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

following elections (exogenous elections) and <LI>the decision is salient and the election outcome depends on it (endogenous … elections). </OL> We show that while the possibility of learning increases activism, the existence of political instability … distorts learning. Furthermore, in contrast to the existing literature, we demonstrate that, when elections are exogenous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144519

Labor Mobility of Scientists, Technological Diffusion, and the Firm's Patenting Decision

Kim, Jinyoung; Marschke, Gerald - In: RAND Journal of Economics 36 (2005) 2, pp. 298-317

We develop and test a model of the patenting and R&D decisions of an innovating firm whose scientist-employees sometimes quit to join or start a rival. In our model, the innovating firm patents to protect itself from its employees. We show theoretically that the risk of a scientist's departure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353928

Careerist Judges

Levy, Gilat - In: RAND Journal of Economics 36 (2005) 2, pp. 275-297

I analyze how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357079

Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - CESifo - 2001

anonymous elections in democracies. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196248

Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Chong, Alberto; O, Ana L. De La; Karlan, Dean; … - Economic Growth Center, Economics Department - 2012

copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653352

Pandering, Faith and Electoral Competition.

Gratton, Gabriele - School of Economics, UNSW Business School - 2011

This paper investigates a common criticism of competitive elections: candidates pander to voters and choose the most …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010543512

Centralization and accountability: theory and evidence from the Clean Air Act

Boffa, Federico; Piolatto, Amedeo; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB), Facultat … - 2012

This paper studies fiscal federalism when voter information varies across regions. We develop a model of political agency with heterogeneously informed voters. Rent-seeking politicians provide public goods to win the votes of the informed. As a result, rent extraction is lower in regions with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548100

Information Markets, Elections and Contracts

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - CESifo - 2011

democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833887