We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information; the principal cannot use monetary transfers to elicit...

We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave...

This paper provides a general theoretical framework that captures the essential features of a Swedish reform where private and public health care providers serve patients with certain functional impairments. Because providers receive a fixed hourly compensation for their services (identical...

A simple symmetric 2 „e 2 strategic coordination game is analyzed in an evolutionary environment under the assumption that agents are able to condition their actions on observations made of the opponent. Agents are assumed to be associated with a profile of characteristics, of which all agents...

Financial options typically incorporate times of exercise. Alternatively, they embody set-up costs or indivisibilities. Such features lead to planning problems with integer decision variables. Provided the sample space be finite, it is shown here that integrality constraints can often be...

One of the most cited studies in recent years within the field of nonstationary panel data analysis is that of Bai and Ng (2004, A PANIC Attack on Unit Roots and Cointegration. Econometrica 72, 1127-1177), in which the authors propose PANIC, a new framework for analyzing the nonstationarity of...

This paper characterizes nonlinear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non-empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient...

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and...