This paper is concerned with the representation of preferences which do not satisfy the ordinary axioms for state-independent utilities.

The paper explores the uniqueness properties of the subjective probabilities in two axiomatizations of state-dependent preferences. Karni, Schmeidler, and Vind's (KSV 1983) system depends on selecting an arbitrary auxiliary probability, and as such, does not guarantee the uniqueness of the...

It has been noticed that whether a preference relation can be represented by state-independent utilities as opposed to state-dependent utilities may depend on which acts count as constant acts [Schervish et al., 1990]. Indeed, this remark underlies an extension of Savage’s expected utility...

I develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. I observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and...

We develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2011a) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. We observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and...

We develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz et al. (J Econ Theory 130:78–94, <CitationRef CitationID="CR15">2006</CitationRef>; Games Econ Behav 62:304–324, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2008</CitationRef>; Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade. University of California, Davis, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">2011a</CitationRef>) as primitives in...</citationref></citationref></citationref>

I develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. I observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and...

I develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. I observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and...

We develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2011a) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. We observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and...