This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To this end, we develop a two stage game...

In this paper we characterize the preferences of a pessimistic social planner concerned with the potential costs of extreme, low-probability climate events. This pessimistic attitude is represented by a recursive optimization criterion à la Hansen and Sargent (1995) that introduces...

In this paper we characterize the preferences of a pessimistic social planner concerned with the potential costs of extreme, low-probability climate events. This pessimistic attitude is represented by a recursive optimization criterion à la Hansen and Sargent (1995) that introduces...

There is a large consensus that low levels of carbon price cannot provide adequate incentives to invest in cleaner technologies and abate emissions. Since carbon demand and price tend to decrease during recessions, economists and policy makers have proposed different types of price stabilizing...

This paper provides a simple procedure that can be used in empirical works aimed at uncovering the preferences of regulators over consumers. The inverting procedure proposed by Ross (1984) for the case of a fully informed regulator is adapted to a regulatory situation characterised by price cap...

There is a large consensus that low levels of carbon price cannot provide adequate incentives to invest in cleaner technologies and abate emissions. Since carbon demand and price tend to decrease during recessions, economists and policy makers have proposed different types of price stabilizing...

In this paper we present a dynamic discrete-time model that allows to investigate the impact of risk-aversion in an oligopoly characterized by a homogeneous non-storable good, sticky prices and uncertainty. Our model nests the classical dynamic oligopoly model with sticky prices by Fershtman and...

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may damage captive customers and have adverse effects on the development of competition when regulated firms also operate in competitive industries. We study two alternative regulatory approaches to limit such a discretion. The...