Shareholders' approval rates on M&A deals are informative, because they are predictive of the acquirer's post-merger operating performance. Since the passing of the deal is salient information while the specific approval rate is not, investors may misprice the detailed voting outcome due to...

Ownership and control have been concentrating in most transition countries. The consolidation of control introduces changes in the power distribution within privatized firms and, most importantly, redirects the corporate governance problem to a conflict between large and small shareholders. In...

We find that active mutual funds owning product market competitors have superior risk-adjusted returns that are not driven by industry concentration, common selection, or stock picking ability. These funds charge higher fees but also generate persistent net-of-fee returns for investors. Funds...

This chapter examines dual class common stock. Dual class stock has evolved from a vehicle used largely by insiders in family owned and media companies to retain control into a popular capital structure for founders and initial shareholders in technology start-ups. After briefly reviewing the...

The increasing use of dual class voting structures in public companies, and the frequency with which such structures contain sunset provisions, raises the issue of when and how such sunset provisions should be modified, extending the company’s use of the dual class structure. Recent decisions...

Exchanges and index providers increasingly push firms to equalize shareholder voting rights. We explore the potential harm arising from dual-class structures by studying the identity and returns of minority shareholders. First, we find that sophisticated investors disproportionately own...