A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained...

We show that limited dealer participation in the market, coupled with an informational friction resulting from high frequency trading, can induce demand for liquidity to be upward sloping and strategic complementarities in traders' liquidity consumption decisions: traders demand more liquidity...

This paper considers the growth of dark pools: trading venues for equities without pre-trade transparency. It first documents the emergence and expansion of dark pools in European equity markets in the context of regulatory changes and increased high-frequency trading (HFT). It finds that the...

We study the introduction of single-market liquidity provider incentives in fragmented securities markets. Specifically, we investigate whether fee rebates for liquidity providers enhance liquidity on the introducing market and thereby increase its competitiveness and market share. Further, we...

We show that limited dealer participation in the market, coupled with an informational friction resulting from high frequency trading, can induce demand for liquidity to be upward sloping and strategic complementarities in traders' liquidity consumption decisions: traders demand more liquidity...

Should we regulate dark trading? This paper studies the effect of suspending dark pools on market fragmentation and liquidity. Using the European regulation MiFID II as a quasi-natural experiment, I show that dark volumes are redirected to lit venues and periodic auctions, in line with a...

We show that (electronic) designated market makers are not necessarily beneficial to the stock market during ash crashes. They actually consume liquidity when it is most needed, even if they are rewarded by the exchange to provide immediacy. This behavior exacerbates the transient price impact,...

A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained...

Garbade and Silber (1979) demonstrate that an asset will be liquid if it has (1) low price volatility and (2) a large number of public investors who trade it. Although these results match nicely with common notions of liquidity, one key element is missing: liquidity also depends on (3) an asset...

Using a novel and comprehensive dataset, we provide the first systematic study of liquidity in the foreign exchange (FX) market. Contrary to common perceptions, we find significant variation in liquidity across exchange rates, substantial costs due to FX illiquidity, and strong commonality in...