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Can Intergroup Collective Sanctions Increase Cooperation? Experimental Approach

Chapkovski, Philipp - 2021

When members of one group encounter a norm violation committed by a member of another group, this antisocial behavior is often handled by picking a random member of the community to which the perpetrator belongs and by applying sanctions to him/her. Despite its prevalence, this kind of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242506

A mechanism of proportional contributions for public good games

Rafat Beigpoor Shahrivar; Duesterhoeft, Ilka; Rogna, Marco - 2023

Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013493119

Coordination Under Threshold Uncertainty in a Public Goods Game

Dannenberg, Astrid - 2011

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game …. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was … generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118207

Contribution Games and the End-Game Effect : When Things Get Real – An Experimental Analysis

Bar-El, Ronen - 2013

We conduct a contribution game for a real public good and show that when the contributors value the real public good highly, they increase their contributions in each round. Thus, contrary to previous literature, free riding decreases over rounds and the end-game effect is reversed

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083744

Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games

Gallier, Carlo - 2014

In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048145

Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem

Dufwenberg, Martin - 2014

Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013049219

Group Size Effects and Critical Mass in Public Goods Games

Pereda, María - 2019

Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has been a major topic of debate since the seminal works on cooperation in the 1960s. Half a century later, scholars have yet to reach a consensus, with some arguing that cooperation is harder in larger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896060

Explaining Individual Contributions in Public Goods Games Using (only) Reciprocity and Overoptimism

Breuer, Wolfgang - 2014

We explain contributions in public goods games with the help of the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) by applying some plausible modifications: Most importantly, we assume that subjects overestimate the kindness of their group members. In combination with the finding that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064567

Efficient Capital Allocation in Public Good Networks

Nora, Vladyslav - 2018

A social planner allocates heterogeneous capital, which determines agents' cost of providing local public goods. Given a capital allocation, agents choose equilibrium efforts. Using a first-order approximation, we uncover a tradeoff between allocating productive capital to central and periphery...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928194

A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty

Anwar, Sakib; Bruno, Jorge; SenGupta, Sonali - 2022

We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups’ position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237520