The article suggests a new explanation for cooperation in large, unstructured societies that avoids the restrictions … for cooperation to be part of an asymptotically stable equilibrium of an evolutionary dynamics of signaling norm … of the social norm and two parameters measuring the cost of cooperation into relation with each other. …

stage, nature draws the costs and benefits of cooperation according to a commonly-known distribution. In the second stage …

Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social … dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 … to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct …

Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social … dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 … to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct …

’s choice. The results show that second mover cooperation is higher when the first mover has little control over their choice … mover cooperation and provide potential explanations for the experimental results. …

Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several … different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the … cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we …

cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where … antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing … cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of …