This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have … natural monopoly. 3) Price competition tends to a monopolization. The results derive from a general principle of reputation … efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms. …

 We develop a reputation model to study the concurrent use of trademarks and certification for food products with a … regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). The model extends Shapiro’s (1983) approach to modeling reputation … firm-specific reputations whereas GI certification captures a notion of collective reputation. The model shows that GI …

induced party should assume the current role of the halal certifies, may enhance the reputation of certifies and reduce the …

monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but … one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this …

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in …-value customers. Hence reputation is a tradable intangible asset, although ownership change is observable. …

Is the reputation of a firm tradeable when the previous owner has toretire even though ownership change is observable …