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The existence of a linear equilibrium in Kyle's model of market making with multiple, symmetrically informed strategic traders is implied for any number of strategic traders if the joint distribution of the underlying exogenous random variables is elliptical. The reverse implication has been...
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Majority rules are frequently used to decide whether or not a public good should be provided, but will typically fail to achieve an efficient provision. We provide a worst-case analysis of the majority rule with an optimally chosen majority threshold, assuming that voters have independent...
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We consider the problem of mechanism design by a principal who has private information. We point out a simple condition under which the privacy of the principal's information is irrelevant in the sense that the mechanism implemented by the principal coincides with the mechanism that would be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850431
Steady state equilibria in heterogeneous agent matching models with search frictions have been shown to exist in Shimer and Smith (2000) under the assumption of a quadratic search technology. We extend their analysis to the commonly investigated linear search technology. -- Search ; Matching ;...
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Zheng has recently proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-private-value environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction requires novel conditions on the bidders' value distribution pro le. We clarify the restrictions implied by these conditions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003185720
We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538847