A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is...

By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in prisoners' dilemmas and in hawk-dove games. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in the preference composition. With complete information about the...

This paper studies a procedural and axiomatic extension of the consensus value [cf. Ju et al. (2007)] to the class of partition function form games. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By...

Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games....

In this note, we state a zero-maximum principle for core allocations, a result which was foreseen by Luenberger (1995). We prove a generalization of the first-zero maximum theorem of Luenberger. Roughly said, an allocation is in the core if for every coalition, the sum of individual benefit...

An n-person differential game Γ(x, T-t) with independent motions from the initial state x and with prescribed duration T - t is considered. Suppose that y(s) is the cooperative trajectory maximizing the sum of players' payoffs. Suppose also that before starting the game players agree to divide...

The idea leading to this study originated some time ago when I talked at a gathering of high school graduates at a summer science camp. I spoke about the theme of "the evolution of cooperation" (in Nature) and about how that topic was amenable to studies involving Game Theory (which, more...

In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each...

We develop a model of coalition formation based on personal proximities among the players of an n-person game. Several examples are worked out in detail, showing that certain coalitions are much more stable than others, and/or much more likely to form than others. We also consider the dynamics...