We consider two-player turn-based game arenas for which we investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not μ-calculus definable. Typically, we can represent constraints on allowed...

The compensation received by economic agents reflects their performance. Usually compensation reflects performance measured cardinally, but sometimes ordinal considerations play a role. It is well established that rewards — cardinal or ordinal — can rationally motivate contestants to put...

The issue of the order dependence of iterative deletion procedures is well known in the game theory community, and conditions on the dominance concept underlying these procedures have meanwhile been detected which ensure order independence (see, e.g., the criteria of Gilboa et al. (1990) and Apt...

In cooperative stochastic dynamic games a stringent condition — that of subgame consistency — is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame consistent if an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later time...

We introduce negative externalities in the form of ill will among the players of the classic two-sided assignment game of Shapley and Shubik, by letting each player's utility be negatively correlated with the payoff of all the players in his group. The new game is very complex, but under a...

In this paper, we explain why the field of cost allocation problems with a coalition structure is a wide and promising unexplored research direction. In particular, we pose some open questions for airport games with a coalition structure.

In this paper, we introduce an extension of (TU) games with a coalition structure. Taking a situation where all coalitions are already established is not reasonable in order to forecast the reality; there is not only one possible coalition, there are several. We consider situations where...

No abstract received.

This work uses the defining principles of the core solution concept to determine not only payoffs but also coalition formation. Given a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, we propose two noncooperative procedures that in equilibrium deliver a natural and nonempty core extension, the...

This paper analyzes whether the behavior of potential offenders can be guided by information on the actual detection probability transmitted by the policy maker. It is established that, when viewed as a cheap-talk game, the existence of equilibria with information transmission depends on the...