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Trust and Uncertainty: How to Communicate Successfully Book Review: Gambetta D. (2011) Kody kriminal'nogo mira. Kak obshñhayutsya mezhdu soboy prestupniki [Codes of the Underworld:...

Griaznova, Olga - In: Journal of Economic Sociology 16 (2015) 2, pp. 80-89

This review is devoted to a description and analysis of the book by Diego Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate. The author studied elements of communicative action basing on signaling theory. In part, he continues the tradition of symbolic interactionism elaborated by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240279

From confrontation to cooperation – institutional support in building cooperation of Polish enterprises

Bednarz, Joanna; Markiewicz, Magdalena - Instytut Badañ Gospodarczych (IBG) - 2015

The article presents results of critical theoretical and empirical analysis of cooperation between Polish enterprises … cooperation of Polish enterprises. Polish companies seem to opt for confrontation, as the main market strategy, basing on the … confrontation to cooperation. The article is divided into four parts. In the first part, there are defined the stages of development …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240286

Authority and Centrality: Power and Cooperation in Social Dilemma Networks

Ramalingam, Abhijit; Rojo Arjona, David; Schram, Arthur; … - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), … - 2015

We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240625

A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon

Marlats, Chantal - In: Economic Theory 58 (2015) 3, pp. 485-507

<Para ID="Par1">This paper provides assumptions for a limit Folk theorem in stochastic games with finite horizon. In addition to the asymptotic assumptions à la Dutta (J Econ Theory 66:1–32, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1995</CitationRef>) I present an additional assumption under which the Folk theorem holds in stochastic games when the horizon is...</citationref></para>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240826

Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

Cox, Caleb; Jones, Matthew; Pflum, Kevin; Healy, Paul - In: Economic Theory 58 (2015) 3, pp. 441-484

<Para ID="Par1">In a sequential-move, finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game (FRPD), cooperation can be sustained if … eliminating the possibility of reputation-building, aggregate cooperation actually increases when histories are revealed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240829

Within-group cooperation and between-group externalities in the provision of public goods

Hattori, Keisuke - In: International Tax and Public Finance 22 (2015) 2, pp. 252-273

formation of within-group cooperation. We show that the equilibrium outcomes may result in a prisoners’ dilemma, depending on …), within-group cooperation does not occur in either group, which leads to Pareto-inferior (superior) outcomes for all agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241935

One bad apple? Heterogeneity and information in public good provision

Oliveira, Angela; Croson, Rachel; Eckel, Catherine - In: Experimental Economics 18 (2015) 1, pp. 116-135

heterogeneous groups to examine the impact of ‘bad apples’ on cooperation and efficiency. Consistent with previous research, we find …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241966

Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size

Nosenzo, Daniele; Quercia, Simone; Sefton, Martin - In: Experimental Economics 18 (2015) 1, pp. 4-14

We study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism games. As in previous experiments … find that cooperation is highest of all in two-person groups. The findings in the high MPCR condition are consistent with … those from n-person prisoner’s dilemma and oligopoly experiments that suggest it is more difficult to sustain cooperation in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241967

Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: experimental evidence

Leibbrandt, Andreas; Ramalingam, Abhijit; Sääksvuori, … - In: Experimental Economics 18 (2015) 1, pp. 15-37

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241971

The convening power of food as growth machine politics: A study of food policymaking and partnership formation in Baltimore

Bedore, Melanie - In: Urban Studies 51 (2014) 14, pp. 2979-2995

partnerships. Drawing from Nellesâ€™ framework for inter-municipal cooperation, and Logan and Molotchâ€™s urban growth machine …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011135261