This paper uses the geometric analysis in Cornes and Sandler to demonstrate the Lindahl equilibrium when private contributions are subsidised in a non-cooperative setting i.e., in a setting where consumers take as constant the contributions by all others when making their own.

The central objective of the research summarized in this report was to explore the ways and means of reforming State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to achieve efficiency, profitability and accountability. Specifically, this project sought to: (i) survey international experience in SOE reform; (ii)...

We examine the effect of introducing Knightian uncertainty into a simple model of public good provision. We find that uncertainty may reduce the free-rider problem if utility is concave in public goods or there are decreasing returns to scale in the production of public goods. It is possible...

Using consistency properties, we characterize the cost-sharing scheme arising from the ratio equilibrium concept for economies with public goods. The characterization turns out to be surprisingly simple and direct. In contrast to most axiomatic characterizations based on reduced games and...

This paper considers a model of voluntary public good provision with two players and convex costs. I demonstrate that the provision of public good is higher in the sequential framework under fairly general conditions. This outcome shows that introducing convex costs may reverse under some...

Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved...

There are significant policy issues surrounding Kenya's economic data production, specifically the scope, timeliness, extent, and specificity of data produced by Kenya's statistical agency, and how economic policymakers treat the importance of this public good. Increasing the scope, timeliness,...

Standard public goods games often assign group members the same marginal per capita returns to public goods production, but in reality group members facing differential individual returns often must collaborate to produce a public good. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to investigate the...