To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been explicitly studied in the literature. More specifically, the parameters that a regulator might use to achieve distributive efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been...

The OECD Growth Study and other empirical work have shown that the strength of competition in product markets plays an important role in the economic growth process as well as contributing to a more efficient allocation of resources in a static sense. More intense competition is likely to...

Product market regulation in the non-manufacturing sectors of OECD countries: measurement and highlights This paper describes a new set of indicators that measure differences in the regulation of non-manufacturing sectors of OECD countries over the past three decades. The indicators focus on...

This document presents the new 2013 set of the OECD Regulatory Impact (REGIMPACT) indicator. It measures the impact of regulatory barriers to competition in non-manufacturing sectors on all industries, through intermediate inputs. The paper describes how the indicator is calculated and discusses...

Electricity systems are increasingly characterized by distributed generation technologies, e.g. rooftop photovoltaic systems, which are used by end consumers to directly produce electricity. Additionally, empirical evidence suggests that electricity retailers exercise market power in many...

Three years after the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima one observes a certain momentum with regard to lifetime extensions as well as some interest in new building ofnuclear power plants. Advocates of nuclear power argue in term of low-cost electricity generation, a secure supply as well as a...

Motivated by recent government interventions in the form of mandated subsidies for new generation capacity, I examine the impact of subsidized entry of electricity generation capacity on the performance of centralized capacity auctions. Subsidized entry suppresses capacity prices and induces an...

I analyze the ability of capacity payment mechanisms to alleviate underinvestment in electricity generation capacity. I derive the optimal capacity payment parameters under two capacity payment mechanisms, when capacity demand is price-elastic and when it is price-inelastic. Price-elastic...

Markets for Power provides an unusually complete analysis of the economic, technical, and institutional aspects of the electric utility industry. The authors evaluate four currently popular options for deregulating this unique segment of the economy, and in a balanced program for reform, they...

Electricity transmission contracts allocate scarce resources, allow hedging against locational price differences and provide information to guide investment. Liquidity is increased if all transmission contracts are defined relative to one balancing point, then a set of two contracts can...