This paper tests whether OECD countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment. We develop two models: with …rm mobility, countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the e¤ective average tax rate, while with capital mobility, countries compete...

In this paper, we pursue several goals; we first check if the downward trend in corporate income tax rates in Europe reflects a strategy of tax competition, and not a "yardstick competition" in neighboring countries. We estimate the scale of fiscal externalities on neighboring countries in terms...

The aim of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the literature dealing with strategic fiscal behaviours of small EU countries using estimations of tax reaction functions of competing national governments. Deriving a simple model of tax competition in a Nash and Stackelberg game, we...

This paper contributes to the small empirical literature that attempts to estimate tax reaction functions of national governments competing with other national governments. After presenting a simple theoretical model, we estimate reaction functions for European countries for a pure Nash model...

This paper contributes to the small empirical literature that attempts to estimate tax reaction functions of national governments competing with other national governments. Our focus is on European countries. After presenting a simple theoretical model, we estimate reaction functions both for a...

This paper challenges the view that tax base equalization by the so-called Representative Tax System (RTS) removes inefficient undertaxation in corporate tax competition. The innovation of the paper is that it focuses on a tax on corporate income, instead of the unit tax on capital considered in...

We ask whether inter-municipal cooperation serve as a platform by which municipalities coor-dinate tax policies and reduce the intensity of tax competition. In this paper, we focus on inter-municipal cooperation in form of inter-local industrial parks. We apply the generalized syn-thetic control...

A general version of the ZMW model of international tax competition is presented that confirms and extends the results of the existing literature about the choice of tax policy instruments in the symmetric case when the tax externality is positive for both countries. In the asymmetric case when...

In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete...

We develop a tax competition model that allows for the setting of both an origin-based and a destination-based commodity tax rate in the presence of avoidance and evasion. In the presence of evasion, jurisdictions will give cross-border shoppers tax preferential treatment, thus not fully...