We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo. We show that it is optimal to publicly disclose...

This chapter provides a roadmap to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets with a specific focus on BtoB market places. On-line intermediation involves two-sided network effects between buyers and sellers, and the implications for optimal BtoB platforms’ tariffs are discussed. The...

We characterize the unique equilibrium in which high ability sellers always announce the quality of their items truthfully, in a repeated game model of experienced good markets with adverse selection on a seller's propensity to supply good quality items. In this equilibrium a seller's value...

This paper studies Stackelberg price competition in a multi-sided market. The second-mover can engage in divide-and-conquer strategies, which involve cross-subsidies between sides. The paper recovers bounds on profits, and refines the results with a selection criteria whereby consumers resolve...

This article summarizes, in a non technical fashion, the main contributions of Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole to the analysis of regulation, with a particular emphasis on their practical implications. We show how their idea of using accounting measures of production costs allows improving...

This chapter provides a roadmap to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets with a specific focus on BtoB market places. On-line intermediation involves two-sided network effects between buyers and sellers, and the implications for optimal BtoB platforms’ tariffs are discussed. The...

In two-sided markets where platforms are constrained to set non-negative prices, tying can be deployed by platforms as a tool to introduce implicit subsidies. For a monopoly, this raises participation and benefits consumers on both sides. In a duopoly, tying on one side makes a platform more or...

We consider a network that intermediates traffic between free content providers and consumers. While consumers do not know the traffic cost when deciding on consumption, a content provider knows his cost but may not control the consumption. We study how pricing consumers'and content...

We determine the optimal health policy mix when the average utility of patients in-creases with the supply of drugs available in a therapeutic class. Health risk coverage rely on two instruments, copayment and reference pricing, that affect the supported risk composed by health expenses and...