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This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts...
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We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several homogeneous landlords and heterogeneous tenants. We model the landlord- tenant economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the equilibrium of this market. In equilibrium, contracts are Pareto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851498
In this paper we study an optimal contract problem under moral hazard in a principal-agent framework where contracts are implemented through random auditing. This monitoring instrument reveals the precise action taken by the agent with some nondegenerate probability r, and otherwise reveals no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255338
This paper investigates the allocation decision of an investor with two projects. Separate managers control the mean return from each project, and the investor may or may not observe the managers’ actions. We show that the investor’s risk-return trade-off may be radically different from a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005292508
We study the incentive problem between the owners of a firm and its CEO's due to the unobservability of the manager's actions. Our model departs from the literature in two ways. First, we acknowledge that, in contrast with standard repeated moral hazard models, actions taken by CEO's have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212516
This paper provides a new rationalization for deposit insurance and systemic disintermediations. I consider an environment in which borrowers face no penalty for failing to repay obligations except the loss of their collateral. I assume that this collateral has aggregate risk. For a subset of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086865