model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching … correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable. -- Matching with couples …

structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … obtained. -- Pareto-optimal ; stable matching ; Pareto-stable matching ; simple matching ; Pareto-simple matching …

. -- matching ; stable payoff ; competitive equilibrium payoff ; optimal stable payoff ; lattice …

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for … admissions ; experiment ; quotas ; matching ; Gale-Shapley mechanism ; Boston mechanism …

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for … admissions ; experiment ; quotas ; matching ; Gale-Shapley mechanism ; Boston mechanism …

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for … admissions ; experiment ; quotas ; matching ; Gale-Shapley mechanism ; Boston mechanism …

We introduce two new sufficient conditions for the existence of stable outcomes in many-to-one matching with contracts …