TThis paper describes a study of the two-sided matching problem with type-specific maximal and minimal quotas with the …

We develop a method to measure the fairness of school matching mechanisms and apply it to the Boston mechanism used in … the Chinese college admissions system. Fairness is measured by mismatch, or the gap between the actual and fair matching …

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching …

. To study centralized college admissions, I advance the theory of stability for many-to-many matching markets with …

We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an …

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of …

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete …

It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a … new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will nd a … stable matching with high probability. In particular we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate …