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the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574107
implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017
We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is also well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716025
We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students … subject to manipulation via cutoffs, a new type of strategic behavior that is introduced by this family of iterative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586814
-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671965
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673364
-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937252
Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138798
The allocation and exchange of discrete resources, such as transplant organs, pub- lic housing, dormitory rooms, and many other resources for which agents have single-unit demand, is often conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. Incentive compatibility and ef?ciency are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704830