the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …

implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …

We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is also well …

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students … subject to manipulation via cutoffs, a new type of strategic behavior that is introduced by this family of iterative …

-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …