WITTMAN HAS WRITTEN A CHARACTERISTICALLY ENGAGING response to my critique. While he emphasizes his continued disagreement with me, I am struck by the important concessions he makes. In particular, he has virtually abandoned the rational expectations assumption that drives his trademark results....

This paper develops a formal theory that combines power-maximizing “Leviathan” political parties with well-defined imperfections in the political process. The model implies that both parties tend to make government larger as their likelihood of electoral victory increases. Empirical tests on...

The political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional public choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views...

Critics of behavioral economics often argue that apparent irrationality arises mainly because test subjects lack adequate incentives; the defenders of behavioral economics typically reply that their findings are robust to this criticism. The current paper presents a simple theoretical model of...

Critics often argue that government poverty programs perversely make the poor worse off by encouraging unemployment, out-of-wedlock births, and other 'social pathologies.' However, basic microeconomic theory tells us that you cannot make an agent worse off by expanding his choice set. The...