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Regulatory relationships and incentives: from Riggs Bank to HSBC

O’Sullivan, Patrick John - In: International Journal of Law and Management 59 (2017) 5, pp. 729-739

work, there is also a focus on the underlying incentives which may adversely affect how a financial institution interacts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014781901

Taiwan's MICE visitors: business, leisure and education dimensions

Chiang, Che‐Chao; King, Brian; Nguyen, Thu‐Huong - In: International Journal of Culture, Tourism and … 6 (2012) 1, pp. 21-33

Purpose – This study seeks to examine the motivational and socio‐demographic characteristics of meetings, incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014768320

Critical factors of wine tourism: incentives and barriers from the potential tourist's perspective

Marzo‐Navarro, Mercedes; Pedraja‐Iglesias, Marta - In: International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management 24 (2012) 2, pp. 312-334

involved must know the incentives for and barriers to (the participation of) potential tourists, as well as the significance of … those incentives and barriers. This paper seeks to address these issues. Design/methodology/approach – An analysis of … existing incentives. Subsequently, a model of structural equations was considered, to establish what effect the previously …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014763113

Knowledge market in organizations: incentive alignment and IT support

Zhang, Zuopeng (Justin); Jasimuddin, Sajjad M. - In: Industrial Management & Data Systems 112 (2012) 7, pp. 1101-1122

potential sellers. Designing and offering different incentives and information technology (IT) support to knowledge workers with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014824414

Leniency Bias in Long-Term Workplace Relationships

Tichem, Jan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256342

The Benefits of Being Economics Professor A (and not Z)

Praag, C. Mirjam van; Praag, Bernard M.S. van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

Alphabetic name ordering on multi-authored academic papers_new, which is the convention in theeconomics discipline and various other disciplines, is to the advantage of people whose lastname initials are placed early in the alphabet. As it turns out, Professor A, who has been afirst author more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256691

The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

We conduct a field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A random subset of the 208 stores participates in two-stage elimination tournaments. Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money across winners of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256723

Social Relations, Incentives, and Gender in the Workplace

Onemu, Okemena - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

they rate their co-worker relationships when they work under individual incentives, group incentives, or a combination of … in the Netherlands. We find correlational evidence that, in the absence of individual incentives, group incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256739

The Self-Perception Theory vs. a Dynamic Learning Model

Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

Several economists have directed our attention to a finding in the social psychological literature that extrinsic motivation may undermine intrinsic motivation. The self-perception (SP) theory developed by Bem (1972) explains this finding. The crux of this theory is that people remember their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257080

Biased Supervision

Delfgaauw, Josse; Souverijn, Michiel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

When verifiable performance measures are imperfect, organizations often resort to subjective performance pay. This may give supervisors the power to direct employees towards tasks that mainly benefit the supervisor rather than the organization. We cast a principal-supervisor-agent model in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257408