We will show that some results in Goyal and Moraga (2001), RAND Journal of Economics 32(4), are incomplete. The results are the social welfare and the total profit of the firms in the complete network is lower than those in some networks. They focus on the symmetric network gk where k is the...

Fjell and Heywood (2004) show that privatization is not necessarily welfare neutral in mixed oligopolies under a production subsidy if firms move sequentially. We find that the neutrality holds for any time structure if instead an output floor is introduced.

We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms each of which derive a student optimal stable matching once we have an initial stable matching. Since there is a method to derive a stable matching, we can derive a...

This study considers a school choice problem with general feasibility constraints. Each student belongs to a grade; and two students belonging to the same grade are symmetric, whereas those belonging to different grades can be asymmetric with respect to the feasibility constraint of a school. We...

If priority relations are not strict orders, then a stable improvement of the welfare of a (sub)group of students from that in a stable matching may no longer be compatible with assuring all remaining students their welfare in that matching. We note a sufficient condition for assuring a group of...

We consider a school choice matching model where priorities for schools are represented by binary relations that may not be total orders. Even in that case, it is necessary to construct total orders from the priority relations to execute several mechanisms. We focus on the extensions of the...