We will show that some results in Goyal and Moraga (2001), RAND Journal of Economics 32(4), are incomplete. The results are the social welfare and the total profit of the firms in the complete network is lower than those in some networks. They focus on the symmetric network gk where k is the...

This study considers a school choice problem with general feasibility constraints. Each student belongs to a grade; and two students belonging to the same grade are symmetric, whereas those belonging to different grades can be asymmetric with respect to the feasibility constraint of a school. We...

We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms each of which derive a student optimal stable matching once we have an initial stable matching. Since there is a method to derive a stable matching, we can derive a...

In this paper, we consider a market where potential firms, which are allowed to be asymmetric, can freely enter and exit, and the total output would be socially excessive without any regulation. The effects of two alternative regulatory policies in the market: the individually transferable quota...

In priority-based two-sided matchings, a respecting-improvements property of a mechanism requires that an agent should get weakly better off when she is assigned a higher priority. Not only is it a normative desideratum, it is also important for ex-ante investments and for disclosure of...

We consider a controlled school choice model where students are divided into several types such as socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged. The priority for a school is dependent on the type distribution of the assignment. Our model is a generalization of several models in previous...