In this paper we apply conjoint analysis to study the influence of changes in the tax rate and the tax base on the perceived tax burden. Our results show that the majority of individuals do not make rational tax decisions based on the actual tax burden, but rather use simple decision heuristics....

Reformblockaden werden derzeit in Deutschland in vielen Bereichen diagnostiziert. Wie können diese Blockaden überwunden werden? Können andere Länder als Vorbild dienen? Wie muss sich der politische Prozess wandeln, um mehr Reformkompetenz zu ermöglichen?

Repeated experiments with a time span of one week between repetitions are used in order to test two related hypotheses. The first is the moral self-licensing effect, which describes peo-ple's tendency to allow themselves to act more selfishly on the back of previous prosocial or selfless...

To examine the effect of group size on the stability of prosocial behavior we used standard one-shot public good experiments with two and four subjects, which were conducted repeatedly three times at intervals of one week. Partner and stranger treatments were employed to control for group...

Choosing between selfish and non-selfish behavior in real life is a repeated decision with var-ying time spans between repetitions. To learn more about the dynamics of altruistic behavior, we use repeated standard dictator experiments. The dynamics of prosocial behavior in these experiments...

A recent experimental study by Falk and Szech (Science, 2013) concludes that „markets erode moral values”. If this were true, economists, who have emphasized the efficiency enhancing effects of markets for centuries, would have to reconsider their judgments fundamentally. This would be no...

We use a controlled laboratory experiment with and without overlapping generations to study the emergence of public debt. Public debt is chosen by popular vote, pays for public goods, and is repaid with general taxes. With a single generation, public debt is accumulated prudently, never leading...

In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a...