In this article we define a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium, provide an example and review the related literature. The article is an entry prepared for The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (Palgrave Macmillan: New York).

This paper studies fertility choices and fertility policies when children's earning abilities are random and parents are altruistic. We characterize equilibrium allocations arising in endowment economies with either complete or incomplete markets. Both models can replicate a number of empirical...

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) in which the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic welfare maximization. When we relax assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, equilibria other than lexicographic welfare...

We consider competitive markets for multiple commodities with endogenous formation of one- or two-person households. Within each two-person household, externalities from the partnerś commodity consumption and unpriced actions are allowed. Each individual has two types of traits: observable...

Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact of such inefficient household decisions on market performance is investigated. At one extreme, market efficiency can occur even when household decisions are inefficient, namely when household...

The epsilon-intelligent competitive equilibrium algorithm is a decentralized alternative to Walrus' tatonnement procedure for markets to arrive at competitive equilibrium. We build on the Gode-Spear-Sunder zero-intelligent algorithm in which random generation of bids and offers from agents'...

We consider a pure exchange economy repeated for an indefinite number of periods from a fixed endowment and posit a learning rule which directs convergence to competitive equilibrium. In each period trade converges to an allocation in the contract set, where agents interpret the current (common)...

We study the impact of endogenous shocks driven by collective actions of managers. We analyze how such endogenous shocks impact social welfare by employing an overlapping-generations model. We first prove that the competitive equilibrium allocation is suboptimal because of the externalities in...