If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using Bayesian learning, it is known that their strategies eventually approximate Nash equilibria of the repeated game under an absolute-continuity assumption on their prior beliefs.  We suppose here that Bayesian learners do not start with...

The World's nations have yet to reach a truly effective treaty to control the emission of greenhouse gases.  The importance of compatibility with private incentives of individual countries has been acknowledged (at least by game theorists) in designing climate policies for the post-Kyoto...

Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the "true" structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it.  An alternative learning...

In Norman (2003), the introduction of individual strategy switching costs, and thus inertia, into stochastic evolutionary coordination games was found inter alia to strengthen the mixed-strategy equilibrium as a short- to medium-run equilibrium. This paper considers the impact of such switching...

This paper models the phenomenon of inertia driven by individual strategy switching costs in a stochastic evolutionary context. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob`s (1993) model of a finite population of agents repeatedly playing a 2x2 symmetric coordination game is extended to allow for such inertia....

This paper considers the extension of Ellison`s (2000) Radius-Modified Coradius Theorem from the uniform-mutations case to a general stochastic setting. A modified theorem is presented, with a crucial role now played by the most probable evolutionary paths between states. The form of such paths...

The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibrium multiplicity more acute. This paper selects amongst these equilibria in the following sense. If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using classical hypothesis testing, it is...

Many dynamic economic situations, including certain markets, can be fruitfully modeled as binary-action stochastic sequential games.  Such games have a state variable, which in the case of a market might be the inventory of the good waiting for sale.  Conditional on the state, players choose...

This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in...

This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents repeatedly matched to play a symmetric 2 x 2 game in biological fitnesses. Each agent is biased in favor of one of the strategies, and receives a noisy signal of his and his opponent`s bias. With...