Incentives of executives and board of directors play an important role in corporate decisions. Principal agent theory suggests a tradeoff between risk and incentives in optimal compensation contracts for managers. The first essay of this dissertation explores the relationship between the...

This dissertation studies foreign firms shareholder value and earnings-related information measures in relation with the implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Chapter One addresses the value implications and empirically tests the changes in market values of foreign firms around SOX...

We extend the existing literature on the factors explaining the value of acquired firms by examining the effect of corporate governance and other characteristics of Japanese and U.S. acquirers on the long-term post-acquisition stock and accounting performance of their U.S. targets over 1980...

This dissertation consists of two essays investigating the labor market for CEOs who have developed a reputation for being a turnaround specialist. Turnaround specialists are managers who have developed reputations for having skills and experience in reversing the fortunes of financially...

There are many reasons why managers are interested in maintaining control over their firm. Some potential reasons include compensation, autonomy, power, perquisites, and the ability to determine the terms under which the firm is acquired. This study examines one event that provides an...

The first chapter of my thesis develops and estimates a dynamic structural partial equilibrium model of schooling and work decisions.  The estimated model explicitly accounts for the simultaneous choice of enrolling in school and working.  It also allows for endogenous leisure choices,...