In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M Ï N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...

This dissertation examines common value auctions in which bidder default is allowed. Contractual default on the part of bidders is commonly observed in many auction settings and yet has remained virtually unexplored in the literature. We develop a two bidder model of a common value auction with...

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze tacit collusion in infinitely repeated price-setting games with capacity constrained firms. The dissertation is comprised of three related essays. The first essay contributes to the literature on optimal penal codes in Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly...

Below are summaries for three essays that share a common theme: each studies a market characteristic that affects price and consumer welfare. The first essay uses experimental methods to test collusive predictions derived in the price-matching literature. Laboratory data demonstrate that...

This dissertation presents an attempt to integrate state-contingent labor and loan contracts in explaining the effects of firm's financial decisions on its employment level and analyzing the fluctuations of employment over the business cycle. As such we propose a model by incorporating...