committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters …Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This …

voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members, who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known …

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …