different voting rules, the frequency of votes for the moral transgression increases with the number of votes required for it … us to identify guilt sharing and preferences for consensual voting as empirically relevant and independent drivers of … voting behavior. …

We study the stability of decision making in committees. A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either …

different voting rules, the frequency of votes for the moral transgression increases with the number of votes required for it … us to identify guilt sharing and preferences for consensual voting as empirically relevant and independent drivers of … voting behavior. …

different voting rules, the frequency of votes for the moral transgression increases with the number of votes required for it … us to identify guilt sharing and preferences for consensual voting as empirically relevant and independent drivers of … voting behavior. …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …

voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …