Markets for credence goods are classified by experts alone being able to identify consumers' problems and determine … appropriate services for solution. Examining a market where experts have to invest in costly diagnosis to correctly identify … problems and consumers being able to visit multiple experts for diagnosis, we introduce heterogeneously qualified experts. We …

When experts have superior information on their customers' needs and appropriate treatment/repair/advice is a credence … good, there are obvious incentives for opportunistic behavior. What compounds this is that experts regularly make treatment …

market efficiency in a setting in which experts need to invest in costly but unobservable effort to identify consumer … problems and consumers are able to visit multiple experts for diagnosis. We introduce heterogeneously-qualified experts … Sisyphean task, as theory predicted. Nevertheless, we observe high skilled experts investing significantly less effort in …

We investigate a market in which experts have a moral hazard problem because they need to invest in costly but … unobservable effort to identify consumer problems. Experts have either high or low qualification and can invest either high or low … effort in their diagnosis. High skilled experts are able to identify problems with some probability even with low effort …