Narrow search
Showing 11 - 20 of 7,443
Cover Image
The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835
Cover Image
Information in a Monopolist's Credence Good Market
Jost, Peter-J.; Reik, Steffen; Ressi, Anna - 2019
the verifiability of the quality provided and the expert's liability. In this paper, we identify the information … and in contrast to traditional models, the verifiability of the quality provided is only of secondary importance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012099117
Cover Image
The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009
, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269558
Cover Image
The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236
Cover Image
On the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets
Fong, Yuk-Fai; Liu, Ting; Wright, Donald J. - In: International journal of industrial organization 37 (2014), pp. 118-129
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011292568
Cover Image
The information paradox in a monopolist's credence goods market
Jost, Peter-J.; Reik, Steffen; Ressi, Anna - In: International journal of industrial organization 75 (2021), pp. 1-13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012802743
Cover Image
The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822832
Cover Image
The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550001
Cover Image
The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Rudolf, Kerschbamer; Matthias, Sutter - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423961
Cover Image
On the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets
Fong, Yuk-fai; Liu, Ting; Wright, Donald J. - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 37 (2014) C, pp. 118-129
contrast to the received wisdom that the market outcome under verifiability of treatment is efficient while the market outcome … under liability for outcome is not. Finally, this paper shows that the existence of some honest experts may induce more … fraudulent behavior by opportunistic experts. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117307